Mapping the Landscape of Europe’s Right
Many right-wing parties in Europe, from West to East, have increasingly aligned themselves with the Kremlin. Prior to the war in Ukraine, these parties comfortably maintained ties with Russia without facing significant backlash. This was particularly evident before the annexation of Crimea, but even in the years following, as Russia continued to be appeased by key European figures, notably former Chancellor Angela Merkel.
During this period, Russia cultivated a relatively stable relationship with the European Union, while simultaneously nurturing and amplifying the influence of these right-wing movements. This has developed into a political phenomenon that can no longer be ignored.
In examining the contemporary European right, it is useful to categorize these parties into two broad groups: the betrayers of history and the opportunists of the new right.
The first group, the betrayers of history, consists of parties whose foundational ideologies were built on opposition to Soviet influence and communism, yet have since shifted into alignment with Moscow.
A primary example is Fidesz in Hungary, established in the late 1980s as an opposition movement to the Marxist-Leninist government of the time. Initially characterized by strong anti-Russian sentiment, Fidesz gradually shifted towards nationalist rhetoric during the 2000s. Under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, it has remained in power for fifteen consecutive years and has become arguably the most consistent apologist for the Kremlin within the European Union, frequently obstructing a unified EU foreign policy response towards Russia.
A second example is the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which in recent years has experienced growing electoral support. Founded in the 1950s as a pan-German nationalist movement, the FPÖ facilitated the political rehabilitation of numerous former Nazi officials, with its first leader being a former SS officer. In contemporary politics, the FPÖ maintains close ties with Russia, formalized through a friendship agreement with Putin’s United Russia Party in 2016. This alignment is particularly ironic, considering a party with roots in Nazi-era nationalism now fosters political cooperation with a former KGB officer who expresses open nostalgia for the Soviet Union.
The third case is the French National Rally, formerly the National Front, founded in 1972 and heavily influenced by the Italian Social Movement, itself a post-fascist continuation of Mussolini’s legacy. The National Front also attracted numerous sympathizers of Vichy France. In recent years, the party has deepened its ties with Moscow, most notably through a multi-million-euro loan received from a Russian bank in 2014, raising significant concerns about financial and political dependency. Its previous leader, Marine Le Pen, has consistently expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, openly endorsed the annexation of Crimea, and has demonstrated reluctance to condemn Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
The second group, the opportunists of the new right, consists of parties that emerged in the 2000s without direct ideological links to controversial historical parties. These parties, while often presenting themselves as fresh alternatives with a blank slate, have nevertheless followed the trend and aligned themselves with Russia. Examples include the Alternative for Germany (AfD), founded in 2013, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) in the Netherlands, founded in 2016, and the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), founded in 2019. Instead of offering genuine ideological renewal, these parties have replicated the same pro-Russian narratives.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD), initially created as a Eurosceptic party opposing the eurozone bailouts, quickly evolved into a broader far-right movement. Over time, the party has become openly sympathetic to Russian positions, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. AfD politicians have visited occupied Crimea, condemned sanctions against Russia, blamed NATO for the conflict, and framed Russia as a misunderstood counterweight to Western liberalism. The party has also adopted the Kremlin narrative that the West provoked Russia through NATO expansion and often portrays Ukraine as a corrupt puppet state used by the United States to weaken Europe.
Similarly, the Forum for Democracy (FvD), emerged with a message of direct democracy and reform of EU institutions but rapidly embraced far-right positions. Under the leadership of Thierry Baudet, FvD has turned into one of the most openly pro-Russian parties in Western Europe. Baudet has praised Putin’s leadership, claimed the West provoked the war in Ukraine, and even promoted conspiracy theories aligning with Russian disinformation. The party has voted against EU sanctions on Russia, criticized military support for Ukraine, and repeatedly downplayed Russian aggression in Europe, instead framing Russia as a defender of European civilization against globalist forces.
In Eastern Europe, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), represents a similar trend. Although Romania has historically been wary of Russian influence, AUR has distinguished itself with nationalist, ultra-conservative, and anti-European rhetoric, often echoing Kremlin talking points. The party opposes Romania’s involvement in Western military aid to Ukraine, accuses NATO and the EU of hypocrisy, and questions Western narratives about the war. At the same time, AUR embraces Orthodox Christian identity and portrays Russia as a traditionalist power resisting Western moral decline, making it attractive to segments of the Romanian electorate that are disillusioned with liberal democratic institutions.
“Viribus Unitis”
Why is Russia so appealing to these right-wing parties? These parties all share a set of common ideological pillars. They are united by strong Euroscepticism, anti-migration positions, conservative worldviews, and an emphasis on national identity, Christianity, and the primacy of national sovereignty. These parties present themselves as a fundamental alternative to the current liberal-democratic system in Europe, and Russia serves as a crucial reference point within this narrative. That being said, it doesn’t mean that the left parties in Europe are holy and don’t flirt with Russia themselves
Russia is frequently invoked as a form of leverage, a way to challenge and threaten the EU establishment. It is framed as a model or an example of a different Europe. For these parties, Russia is not merely a foreign actor but a symbolic alternative to the European Union. In their rhetoric, Russia represents strength, traditional Christian values, firm border control, prioritization of national interests, and open opposition to what they label as the hypocrisy of the West and NATO.
This alignment is further reinforced by the Kremlin’s deliberate and pragmatic approach to foreign political influence. The Kremlin employs what scholars like Braghiroli and Makarychev have termed the strategy that the Kremlin employs as „trans-ideological“. This means that Russia is willing to cooperate with any political forces, be they far-right, far-left, or anti-establishment movements, as long as these actors serve Russian geopolitical interests. , but not to the extent to which the right does it, and certainly not as open. It should also be noted that the left that falls in this category does not get the same support or platform as the right.
The Kremlin adapts its messaging to appeal to a wide variety of political movements, even if these groups fundamentally disagree with each other on most ideological grounds. For Russia, this contradiction is irrelevant. The primary goal is to maximize external support and political influence within the European Union, irrespective of ideological consistency. It is a pragmatic, opportunistic strategy, focused not on ideological loyalty, but on expanding Russia’s influence wherever possible.
For right-wing parties, Russia portrays itself as the defender of Christianity, traditional values, and national sovereignty against the perceived moral decline of Western liberalism. These parties frame Russia as the last bastion of strength and order in a world where they believe Western democracies have fallen into decadence and hypocrisy. From the perspective of these right-wing movements, Ukraine is not seen as a sovereign state resisting aggression, but rather as a victim caught in a broader confrontation between Russia and NATO, allegedly provoked by the expansionist and interventionist policies of the West.
This selective reasoning is mirrored in other geopolitical issues, such as Kosovo. Although these right-wing parties strongly oppose Kosovo, often describing it as “stolen Christian land” and dismissing it as a “product of Western hypocrisy,” they simultaneously champion the separatist regions of Donbass, Donetsk, and Luhansk. In these cases, they justify separatism as a legitimate expression of Russian interests and a rightful pursuit of national self-determination through a realist geopolitical approach, revealing their inconsistency in their application of sovereignty principles.
In the same vein, and with the same rhetorical framework, many of these parties deny the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia and openly promote strong pro-Serbian sentiment, aligning themselves with narratives that excuse or minimize atrocities committed by groups perceived to be geopolitical allies of Russia.
Rethinking the Right
Why is all of this important? The political causes championed by the right in Europe, despite everything, are nevertheless important. Even if one does not agree with their views, it is undeniable that having an alternative voice and an opposition that challenges mainstream politics, the establishment, and the status quo is healthy for any democratic system. This presence usually brings balance to policy-making, forcing those in power to consider the impact of their actions and decisions more carefully.
But what are the paradoxes we find within these right-wing parties? Many of these parties place great emphasis on national history, especially in Eastern Europe where their countries suffered under communism and Soviet domination. In fact, as mentioned before, some of these parties were founded on anti-communist sentiment, yet they have now completely deviated from their original stance.
Furthermore, while these parties constantly speak about protecting local traditions, culture, and Christianity, Russia engages in cultural propaganda promoting a so-called “civilizational” model that, in practice, enforces a homogenized, state-centered authoritarian narrative rather than preserving organic European traditions.
On security, many of these parties criticize and undermine key security institutions while simultaneously calling for stronger armies and defense capabilities. Yet, they ignore the reality that the very security umbrella they demonize, particularly NATO, is the reason they have any security at all.
Economically, these parties promote protecting national industries and economic sovereignty, but in practice, their policies would make their countries dependent on Russian gas and resources, creating a form of modern vassalage.
In terms of migration, they are among the most vocal opponents of illegal migration and proponents of anti-Muslim rhetoric, claiming to defend Europe’s Christian identity. Yet, Russia has repeatedly weaponized migration, as seen in the Belarus–Poland border crisis, and has destabilized regions to create refugee flows. Simultaneously, Russia itself is home to radicalized and militarized Muslim Chechen units who are actively fighting and killing European Christians in Ukraine.
Finally, while these parties fiercely oppose globalism and Western liberal elites, the Russia they admire is in reality a deeply corrupt kleptocracy, run by oligarchs who epitomize everything these parties claim to despise.
The emergence of a new type of right-wing in Europe could represent a constructive and stabilizing development within the continent’s political landscape. Such a right-wing should be free from Russian influence and unburdened by the ideological baggage of the past, avoiding the contradictions that have undermined many current right-wing movements. It should adopt a pro-European orientation, recognizing that the European Union, despite its flaws, provides a crucial framework for political cooperation, security, and economic prosperity.
A current example that comes closest to this vision is Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), which, despite its identity, has maintained a firm pro-European and pro-NATO stance. Unlike other right-wing movements, Meloni has distanced herself from the Kremlin, openly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supporting Western sanctions. Her government has demonstrated a pragmatic understanding of Italy’s geopolitical interests, balancing national conservatism with commitment to the European Union and transatlantic alliances. This approach shows that it is possible for right-wing parties to defend cultural identity and national sovereignty while respecting international norms, supporting democratic alliances, and contributing to European stability rather than undermining it.
Rather than pursuing a self-defeating agenda of institutional sabotage, this reformed right-wing would recognize the value of constructive opposition. It would not seek to dismantle political structures that ultimately safeguard their nations‘ stability, but would instead focus on meaningful policy debates. It could play an important role in addressing legitimate societal concerns, particularly on issues such as migration, identity, and national sovereignty, but would do so in a way that strengthens rather than fragments the European project. In doing so, it could offer voters a genuine alternative within the democratic system, one that challenges excesses without undermining the fundamental pillars of European unity and security.
Author: Rron Dragidella
Photo Source: https://pixabay.com/photos/moscow-river-russia-embankment-3617070/