The Charming Dragon: A New Era for China’s Soft Power?

Over the period following the end of the Cold War, arguably one of the most defining features of international relations has been the emergence of China as a key global actor. Initially, this has been the most evident in the economic realm; however, gradually it also became visible in other domains, such as Beijing’s “emerging institutional statecraft” (Ikenberry & Lim, 2017) and the country’s increasingly assertive foreign policy postulations.

One area in which China appeared to lag quite significantly behind the US, as well as other global or regional actors, has been that of soft power (软实力 in Chinese), which can be defined as the ability to influence others without coercion or bribery, shaping the preferences of other actors through attraction. The concept is also paramount as it makes the rise in hard power (e. g.: military) appear less frightening and thus makes the forming of a coalition against the rising power less likely (Nye, 2012, p. 154.).

Despite the initial lag, lately, there appears to be a shift benefiting Beijing. This leads one to ask questions: In what domains can we observe that China is exerting its soft power? What are the factors which have led to its awakening? And what are the sources, as well as possible limitations to it?

Background

For many years, Chinese soft power was conceived of in academic and policy circles in the West as virtually non-existent, with some going as far as to argue that the significant funds (one estimate stating it to be around 10 billion dollars annually) spent by Beijing on attempts at bolstering its image abroad are one of the country’s most wasteful investments (Raby, 2019 & The Economist, 2019). However, recent changes suggest that these initiatives might finally be coming to fruition. Almost exactly 6 years to the anniversary of an article in The Economist, which stated that the funding dedicated to improving the soft power of China is without results, the magazine published an article with the following title “How China Became Cool?” (The Economist, 2025). It is therefore worthwhile to try to chart the developments that have led to this change in perception.

While Beijing’s attempts at increasing its soft power can be traced back to at least as far as 2007, this goal has certainly become more prominent under the leadership of Xi Jinping. In 2011, as he was preparing to step up, the 17^th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) dedicated a special plenary session to the topic of culture, with its final communiqué stating that the end goal is turning China into a “socialist cultural superpower” (Shambaugh, 2015, p. 99.).

This aim has been continuously reiterated by Xi Jinping, who urged the country to become a cultural powerhouse by 2035 (CGTN, 2024b). The question of soft power is also paramount, as despite the fact that according to many, the US appears to be declining and China to be on the ascent, it is questionable if any country can become a global leader without having domination over this domain. With that having been said, let us now turn to examining how China fares in some of the dimensions contributing to soft power.

Media

For a while now, Beijing has dedicated significant funds to establishing its own global media foothold, in great part to counter Western narratives about the country. Several news outlets have increased the number of journalists permanently posted in foreign bureaus.

These outlets often have a special focus on the developing world, where Western media outlets are less prominent. Among other things, we can highlight that CCTV (which rebranded itself to CGTN in 2016 internationally) now broadcasts in several world languages and China Radio International (CRI) broadcasts in 38 languages across the globe (Albert, 2018). The journalists posted abroad also allow Beijing to document developments abroad in real time, thereby rivalling Western outlets, such as Reuters.

Additionally, the effect China is having on Hollywood has also been noted. Studios, wishing their films to be among the few select titles which are annually allowed into the Chinese market, avoid portraying the country in a negative light or outright move to praise it in their works (Albert, 2018).

Chinese film and entertainment firms have also acquired American counterparts in deals worth tens of billions of dollars; however, following Trump’s first presidency and the spectacular collapse of several Hollywood deals, the relationship has never returned to its “honeymoon phase” (Seaton, 2022).

Education and Culture

Perhaps one of the most well-documented domains through which Beijing aims to increase its soft power is that of education and culture.

The main conduits of these initiatives have been Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs), later on accompanied by Chinese Cultural Centres. The establishment of CIs and CCs started in 2004, and since then their numbers have increased drastically.  By 2005, there were already 32 Confucius Institutes in 23 countries and, by over a decade later, in 2016, there were more than 500 CIs and 1000 CCs located in 134 countries (Gill & Huang, 2005, p. 18.; Hsiao & Yang, 2019, p. 196.). Confucius Institutes and Classrooms have made inroads both in the developed and in the developing world.

These institutions, however, suffered from much criticism in Western democracies due to allegations of spreading Chinese propaganda and the perceived suppression of sensitive topics, prompting some Western universities to avoid or restrict cooperation with them.

Besides offering language and culture courses, it has been argued that CIs also serve as conduits for portraying China as a reliable and trustworthy partner, enhancing its bilateral relations with the countries where such institutions operate (Hsia & Yang, 2019, p. 214.).

Other than CIs and CCs, which aim to popularise Chinese culture and language abroad, China has also been generous in offering professional training and scholarships for foreigners to study in the country. The Ministry of Education openly stated in a 2017 document that part of the goal of attracting foreign students is to facilitate understanding and friendlier perceptions of China (Repnikova, 2022, p. 31.). The success of these programmes is greatly enhanced by the fact that Chinese universities are increasingly ranked higher internationally, making them attractive destinations for prospective students.

While these opportunities primarily attract the people of the developing world, these initiatives are also aimed at Western countries, as evidenced, for instance, by President Xi’s plan to welcome 50,000 American students to China in 5 years (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the United States, 2024).

As for professional trainings, we can mention initiatives which are specifically aimed at journalists or officials, which indeed have proven to increase the perception of China abroad (Repnikova, 2022, p. 32. and p. 36.).

The China Model

The so-called “China Model” may also be understood as a source of soft power, as China’s economic rise made it an object of admiration and study on the international scene, with many countries (especially from the Global South) wishing to emulate it.

Indeed, this Beijing Consensus is more popular than the Washington Consensus in the developing world (at least when it comes to the leadership of said countries) (Nye, 2023, p. 98.). Much of the attractiveness of this model is derived from the fact that China could achieve staggering economic growth and modernisation while generally maintaining its original political structure and not undergoing political liberalisation as espoused by Western experts.

The China Model/Beijing Consensus does however, suffer from a major shortcoming, as evidenced by the struggle between particularism and universalism present in Chinese academic and policy circles (Hendricks, 2022, pp. 14-15.). Claims of particularism are often used to argue against Western criticisms of the country in relation to alleged human rights violations and the lack of political freedom, with Chinese thinkers saying that these values are not Universal, but rather Eurocentric and neglect the cultural particularity of China which prescribes different values and governments or at the very least, different understandings of concepts such as “freedom” or “human rights”. Given the constant reliance on claims of particularity, afterwards, to turn around and argue for the implementation of Chinese-style modernisation abroad could come across as disingenuous.

It is also worth noting that the whole concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” emphasises the need to adapt an otherwise universalist philosophy (Marxism) to local economic situation and needs (Wang Weiguang, 2021).

Additionally, it should also be noted that it is highly questionable if there is any place in the globe which could completely emulate the economic miracle of China, as it has been in large part a result of circumstances and facts which are particular to the East Asian country and not necessarily present in the states that would wish to emulate it.

Foreign Aid

A large body of research suggests that foreign aid possesses strategic dimensions, such as affecting foreign policy decisions, as well as economic policies in a way that benefits the country issuing development financing (Toettoe, 2023, p. 52. & Blair et al. 2019, p. 8.). Besides these, and more importantly for us, it has also been found that the soft power of the issuing country is affected by foreign aid (Toettoe, 2023, p. 52. & Blair et al., 2019, p. 6.).

It has been also argued that for foreign aid to be a vector of soft power, it must meet four criteria: (1) the aid must be perceived as altruistic, (2) the source of the aid must be visible, (3) it must be effective, and lastly (4) it must align with the priorities of the recipient country in question (Psaki, 2025).

This could be a very interesting dimension to investigate. However, when it comes to analysing the connection between Chinese aid with and soft power, much of the research is contradictory, with findings ranging from increased soft power, (Wellner et al., 2022, p. 35.) through stating that it may not have a significant effect, (Toettoe, 2023, p. 56. & p. 73.) all the way to deteriorating perceptions of China (Blair et al., 2019, p. 30.).

These contradictory findings can be explained by several factors, such as the incomplete data on Chinese aid projects, the heterogeneity of countries under study, as well as the research methods used among other things (Toettoe, 2023, p. 51.).

That being said, one thing is certain: Trump’s inward-turning policy, his decision to cut USAID will result in the weakening of US soft power across the globe (Psaki, 2025), thus opening up significant space for China. And Beijing will step up to fill out this void, especially in strategic regions where it was already catching up with the US (e. g.: South-East Asia) (Kurlantzick, 2025).

Recent Breakthroughs

Despite the initial scepticism about China’s bet on soft power, which we have discussed, there is a body of evidence indicating that the PRC’s stagnation in this field is over. We now examine some of the more recent breakthroughs.

Beijing has successfully broken into the realm of social media. TikTok, a platform originating from China has revolutionised the field with its short-video-format, and many other companies followed suit, pivoting towards this design. earlier this year, when the app faced the possibility of being banned in the US, American netizens flocked to Xiaohongshu (XHS), better known internationally as RedNote, an app, which unlike TikTok was not primarily curated for a Western audience.

Red Note gave the opportunity for grassroots cultural exchange between Chinese and American netizens to emerge, defying the adversarial governmental relations between these two countries, serving as a significant soft power boost to China, greatly undermining the negative view constructed of the country by US media and government (Viswanathan, 2025).

Besides social media, modern cultural products have also succeeded in gathering an international audience. In 2024, for the first time ever, Black Myth: Wukong, a Chinese video game, was among the top considerations for game of the year award at the Game Awards, while winning in three categories at the Steam Awards, being the first ever video game to do so (Bolding, 2024).

The story of the game is essentially a sequel to the plot of the 14^th century Chinese novel Journey to the West, proving that Chinese culture can be enticing to an international audience if presented correctly. The film Ne Zha 2 also garnered significant domestic and international interest, something which has been quite uncommon for Chinese films, with very few exceptions.

It is also worth taking a look at how the global perception of China is currently. A well-noted observation has been that Beijing has more appeal in the Global South than the Global North, the latter generally having less favourable views of the country (Repnikova, 2022, p. 53. & Asia Society Policy Institute, 2024). Indeed, a 2020 Afrobarometer poll found that even during the height of COVID-19, Chinese influence continued to be seen as a net positive by the people in the African continent (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Selormey, 2020, p. 1.).

While China has been for a long time now seen as a positive actor in Africa, lately this has also been becoming true for the SoutEast Asia region (SEA). This is demonstrated by the fact that the latest ISEAS survey finds that Beijing is seen as a more significant partner in South-East Asia than Washington and has recently even overtaken it in terms of popularity within the region (with China being considered more favourably by 50.5 % against the 49.5 % for the US in 2024, a drastic change compared to the figures of 38.9 % and 60.1 % in 2023) (Seah, S. et al., 2024, p. 38. & p. 48.).

It must be stated that this shift had started before the second Trump administration began reducing aid and was also likely exacerbated by Washington virtually giving a carte blanche to Israel in its military operations in Gaza since 2023, as well as perceived US hypocrisy (e. g.: selective preaching of democracy in the region). Additionally, Chinese products are increasingly viewed as on par with or even superior to their American counterparts, undermining the authority so far derived from high US quality (Kurlantzick, 2025). Research also suggests that Beijing’s weight in the affairs of the SEA region has only been enhanced as a result of Covid-19 (Tan, 2022, p. 69.), as evidenced by, for instance, the so-called “vaccine diplomacy” (ibid., p. 67).

Two facts are also worth emphasising. First, a worldwide poll conducted by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, surveying 110,000 people globally, has found that for the first time ever, global opinion favours China over the US (Reuters, 2025), although even here, the North-Side discrepancy of views is observable. Second, while the vast majority of Americans hold unfavourable views of China, since 2024, there has been a noticeable improvement in how the country is perceived, with young people being particularly soft on the country (Huang et al., 2025).

The advancement of Beijing’s soft power is also visible in the most recent Global Soft Power Index, published by Brand Finance. In this Index, China ranks second, being surpassed only by the United States (Bi, 2025). The ranking is also impressive since in 2021 China was in 8^th place and 4 years later is now trailing the US (The Economist, 2025).

Limitations

It is beyond a doubt that China has an immense cultural foundation to rely on for its soft power. The world has fallen in love with the richness and uniqueness of Chinese culture more than once in the past, such as during the chinoiserie trend in much of Western Europe (CGTN, 2024a). While this abundant fountainhead, combined with government – and, as we shall soon see, bottom-up – initiatives, did facilitate the impressive growth of the country’s international standing, there are certain constraints which Beijing might find hard to overcome.

One such limitation can be identified in the form of linguistic and cultural barriers. However, according to several scholars, the main barrier to the country’s attempts at bolstering its soft power are the negative perceptions of China’s government as “too authoritarian”, as well as several of the country’s domestic policies being considered controversial abroad, although this is much truer for the developed rather than the developing world (Tsongo et al., 2025, p. 71). Indeed, the PRC’s neighbours, like Japan or South Korea. can be considered as soft power giants despite their relatively smaller economy and international influence, which is in great part due to the fact that they do not suffer from this external perception.

Besides the perception as overly-authoritarian, it is also worth emphasising that soft power is in great part generated by non-governmental organisations and civil society. In contrast, China does not give as much free rein to NGOs and civil society, and largely relies on state initiatives (Nye, 2012, pp. 154-155.). Still, there is some nuance, and we must mention that despite popular characterisations of China’s push towards soft power being completely top-down, there is a significant level of localisation and decentralisation in reality (Repnikova, 2022, pp. 52-53.). However, one might still find that even more localisation and bottom-up initiatives are needed if Beijing wants to get the most out of its potential for soft power.

It is clearly observable that much of the newly-found admiration surrounding China stems from organic, as opposed to government-orchestrated sources. The flocking of thousands of American netizens to Xiaohongshu and the subsequently developed favourable opinions regarding China was not due to any grand design by Beijing. Another recent event, which rather unexpectedly succeeded in bolstering the PRC’s image abroad, has been the visit of the American streamer IShowSpeed. It was the warm welcome he received from the locals, his genuine reaction to the vibrant culture, rich history and local technological advancements, which prompted his audience to come away with an overwhelmingly positive view of the country, with several commenters noting that his streams from the country “undid decades of American anti-China propaganda”. Additionally, Trump’s policies also resulted in a slump in global public opinion for the United States, which greatly contributed to creating more room for Beijing to appear as a reliable and responsible global actor.

Indeed, even the popularity of contemporary cultural products, such as the mobile game Genshin Impact (which is one of the 4 Chinese-originating mobile games out of the 10 highest-grossing ones in 2024), and AAA/Triple-A video game Black Myth: Wukong, have been likely more successful in getting people interested in China than certain government initiatives.

Overall, the government of China may find that state efforts might have yielded fewer results than organic bottom-up developments, which may not have even intended to court an audience abroad (The Economist, 2025).

In conclusion, we have seen that China’s soft power appears to have entered a new era and can no longer be dismissed as ineffective or “non-existent”. From cultural products, social media platforms, through education, aid and the appeal of the China Model/Beijing Consensus, the country has found new avenues to exert its influence globally.

Yet, there is a significant paradox at hand: for all the funds dedicated to enhancing the country’s image, many of the most successful breakthroughs arise not from state-led initiatives, but from organic, often unintended bottom-up events and developments. As China rises in global soft power rankings and opinion polls, several questions arise. Can China close the gap in opinion between the Global North and the Global South? Can the constraints stemming from tight state control and controversial domestic policies be overcome to enhance the country’s image in the developed world? And can its leadership succeed in reconciling state-centric narratives with spontaneous sources of attraction?

Whether China can sustain this momentum and successfully translate it to long-term legitimacy still remains to be seen.

Author: Bendegúz Bottyán

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