The history of the South Caucasus countries shows that the strategic interest shown towards each state has always been part of the global blueprint, and the foreign policy vectors of the Transcaucasian countries have also been determined by the rules of the hegemonic state. The 21st century is no exception, and a single strong state in the region is being replaced by a new power. A rising global player in the form of China has been entering the South Caucasus since the 2000s and achieved strategic superiority in 2013, when it launched the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. At this stage, the People’s Republic of China mainly uses elements of soft power, such as business, financial investments, and tourism benefits, although in a multipolar world, China’s actions can be compared to a game of chess, with plans calculated several moves in advance. Accordingly, the article will show, at the level of international relations theories, when and why China decided to seize the “free space”, we will examine the theories of Ratzel and Kjellén, we will talk about the theories of spheres of influence and hegemonic stability, which will allow us to see the practical manifestation of the theory of regional interdependence and see chronologically how an ideologically different state on the continent can enter the South Caucasus, become a political alternative for these countries and turn geo-economic leverage into a geopolitical game. Game or Goal? China started the chess game with a pawn.
China as a new global power in the Caucasus:
Geopolitics is considered one of the most fundamental directions for international relations, where theory and practice coincide; therefore, we can see a clear connection between the state and its goals. Based on this reasoning, it will be easy to guess that the ascendancy of China was not unexpected for global politics, and it is not accidental that China paid special attention to the countries of the South Caucasus, although this was not unfounded.
In the theory of international relations, if we take into account the arguments of Ratzel and Kjellén, who consider the state as a “living organism” where, in a “free space”, the strong take the place of the weak and, accordingly, are subject to constant competition (Mills, 2025). It will then become clear that China’s interest in the post-Soviet countries of the South Caucasus in the 1990s was due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was no longer a clear hegemon in the region, and it became possible to engage in the struggle to fill the “geopolitical vacuum”.
Although the 1990s were the first stage when China appeared in the region as an actor, as evidenced by the fact that Armenia purchased WM-80 multiple-launch systems from China in 1999, it did not directly participate in political events. The second important stage of the relationship began in the 2000s and reached its highest point when the “One Belt, One Road” initiative was launched under the leadership of current President Xi Jinping, which is also called the Silk Road, as the project involves the establishment of land and sea connections with Europe and Africa (Poghosyan, 2024). Naturally, the initiative could not be implemented without the main strategic point, the Caucasus Transport Corridor, and in the event of mutual intention, cooperation between the states could be successfully carried out. This can be compared to the possibilities of the queen’s movement. Because this strategy opened up borders in all directions, and the right steps could have yielded results quickly, but one unforeseen action and the global game was over.
If we ask what the reason was for China’s success in the queen, we will again find the answer in movements. The main basis for this is the establishment of additional ties, which is certainly not alien to soft power. China was not focused on just one state; it wanted regional dominance, which meant the constant advancement of the pawns. In practice, that is, the country gradually concluded agreements, created businesses, established tourist ties, gave young people the opportunity to receive education in its own country, and these were systematic, purposeful steps.
This can be confirmed by the free trade agreement signed between Georgia and China in 2017, which shows the initial economic goals. It is noteworthy that Georgia was the first country in the South Caucasus to sign a free trade agreement. In the same year, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing allocated $114 million for the construction of a bypass road around Adjara (Georgia), which facilitated international transit in strategic areas near the Black Sea (Poghosyan, 2024). Six years after these happenings, in 2023, Georgia signed a strategic partnership agreement with China, which focused on four areas: political, economic, people-to-people and cultural, and international, and in 2024, Georgia awarded the construction of a new deep-water port in Anaklia to a Chinese consortium.
Azerbaijan was no exception, when a comprehensive strategic partnership was signed between China and Azerbaijan in 2025, the main directions of which included Legal issues, Green development, and the Digital economy (Akhalaia, 2025). It should also be noted that China signed an agreement with both states only after they recognized the existence of a “United China”, meaning that Taiwan’s independence would have been unacceptable to Georgia and Azerbaijan, and it was recognized as part of China.
Also, in August 2025, the same thing happened between Armenia and China, when a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed, and in the statement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan we read: “Armenia firmly supports the principle of “One China”. It looks forward to expanding economic and trade cooperation with China, maintaining close coordination on international and regional issues, and further developing bilateral relations” (Publika, 2025). For China, recent agreements create a situation similar to playing in the opponent’s half (On the chessboard).
For statistics, China-Azerbaijan bilateral trade reached $3.1 billion in 2023, a year-on-year increase of 43.5 percent; China became Azerbaijan’s second largest source of imports for the first time, ahead of Türkiye (Sigurdh, 2024).
In 2024, exports from Georgia to China amounted to only $303 million, while imports amounted to $1.61 billion. The difference is clear: the volume of imports exceeds exports by five times. For Georgia, China is more of a supplier than a buyer, so in addition to political agreements and goals, China is driven by the market and trade. Since Georgia’s economy is not based on self-production, China is capturing as much business as possible, because an increase in the number of export markets will lead to more production and ultimately dependence (BTUAI, 2025).
Transformation of China’s political plans in the South Caucasus:
Doubts about China’s emergence as a global political actor have been raised among political scientists since the 1990s, especially in Eurasia. The United States, the “incumbent hegemon”, was particularly interested in the existence of potential competitors, as was well demonstrated by the American-Polish political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1997, when he published his book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. What is interesting in this section is the fact that a chess game is being played to gain power on the Eurasian continent, and whoever occupies Eurasia would also have global influence. Brzezinski names several „geostrategic players“ as potential rivals in Eurasia: Germany, France, Russia, and China (Šerić, 2025).
Considering the current situation, we can say that not only has the list of potential competitors been justified, but a new power has emerged, for example, in the form of India, which poses a threat to US hegemony.
Despite the fact that China started with an economically oriented policy, we may recall from the above that it had a political issue, in the form of Taiwan, attached to it from the very beginning. For the same reason, the Georgian government stands out globally as the only government that refuses to accept citizens with Taiwanese passports, since Georgia has a similar problem in the form of the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The connection between them is obvious: if Tbilisi accepted Taiwanese passports, which is a signal of recognition of Taiwan’s independence, this could force Beijing to do the same by recognizing Abkhazian passports (Sigurdh, 2024).
In 2023, Georgia, along with a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, expressed support for China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI). In the statements of the US and the West, we read that this is detrimental to Georgia’s relations with the West, such a position on the part of Georgia is completely incompatible with its ambition to join NATO, and the country will thus deviate from the Western model of democratic development and modernization (Sigurdh, 2024).
Given the interdisciplinary nature of international relations and geopolitics, and also based on an assessment of the past, we can say that Russia was considered a regional dominant power in the Caucasus, to which the “Spheres of influence theory” is the answer – In international politics, the claim by a state to exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory (Deudney, 2025).
Taking a broader view of regional politics, we can see that China signed comprehensive strategic agreements with the South Caucasus countries after 2022, when the Russo-Ukrainian war began and Russia’s full power could no longer be focused on regional hegemony. Despite noticing China’s dominant role, Russia does not have much aggression towards China, why?! We can see the reason for this in several aspects:
- China and Russia are united by the international economic organization BRICS,
- Both actors have similar perspectives on global politics,
- NATO and similar organizations are considered a threat to national security,
- The West/USA is considered the main factor of insecurity, aggression, and confrontation in the world.
It was precisely against the backdrop of the recent increased threat and the prospect of losing its dominant role in the Caucasus, as well as China’s promotion of the idea of launching the Southern Corridor, which was to take place through Iran, that the US immediately signed an agreement with Armenia and Azerbaijan in August 2025, in order to, on the one hand, resolve the regional conflict, and on the other hand, create a transport corridor that separates the region from Iran and, in order to emphasize the dominant role of the US, it was called “Trump’s path to international peace and prosperity” (radiotavisupleba, 2025). On the world chessboard, China delivered the first check, followed by the United States.
Future prospects and future regional scenario:
As we have seen from theoretical analysis and statistical data, despite the fact that economic interests were at the forefront under the influence of soft power, political goals are hidden behind this. The obvious goal is the Taiwan issue and emphasizing China’s dominance. Meanwhile, the hidden goals can be explained by the „Theory of regional interdependence“, that is, complete hegemony in the region, and not just in one state. To explain it simply:
Until the 1990s, the Soviet Union existed, and the Caucasus region was under its protection. After the collapse of the USSR, the West, including the USA, was perceived as filling the free space. During this period, China emerged on the international stage as an actor and wanted to control the world strategic corridor – the South Caucasus. In order to easily achieve this goal, it raised it to the level of a concept – „One Belt, One Road“. Its strengthening, accordingly, affects the weakening of the West, that is, Ratzel’s theory is visible, that the strong always takes the place of the weak. Against the background of the current Russia-Ukraine, Russia also seemed to distance itself from the processes for a short time, because the US felt the danger that without a quick response, it might lose the region, and also, Russia, especially in its relations with Armenia, is no longer as stable as in the past, entering with a new energy project and thus reducing Iran’s influence, while forcing China to develop a new path. Also, the European Union, against the background of reduced cooperation with Georgia, is activating work with Armenia, so as not to lose regional dominance.
With this scenario, we have come to the present day, and here the answer should be given; can a game that started with a pawn “win the match”? Politically, the question is controversial and in fact indefinite, however, if we consider current events, including Trump’s “nationalist” policy and Western statements, as well as the growth of China’s role in the form of a comprehensive strategic partnership and the Anaklia port, as well as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine global war and the fact that China has managed to enter/establish itself in the region in a very short period of time, then there will be a greater probability of China’s future hegemony. The process should be assessed as ongoing and, in case of stability, as an achievable goa. This is also given additional impetus by the new political course of each of the South Caucasus countries, which can hardly be described as pro-Western.
Author: Anna Alikadze
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Photo Sources: https://www.sciencenews.org/article/chess-players-familiar-moves-memory /https://www.britannica.com/place/China (Generated by Anna Alikadze)
